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1 THE TWO DILEMMAS OF METAPHILOSOPHY
There is a growing interest in metaphilosophy, the study of the methodology 
of philosophy. A central topic in recent contributions to metaphilosophy is 
the role of intuitions in philosophy, especially their role as evidence for (or 
rather against) philosophical theories. Intuitions seem to play this role in 
conjunction with so-called “hypothetical cases” or “thought experiments”. 
On the standard view, philosophy proceeds by considering hypothetical cases 
and forming intuitive judgements about these cases, which are then in turn 
used as evidence in favour or against philosophical theories. Metaphilosophy 
is then concerned with a general assessment of this practice: Are intuitive 
judgements indeed reliable evidence for philosophical theories? Experimen-
tal philosophers (e.g. Machery, 2017) argue that intuitions can empirically be 
shown to vary a lot and thus to be unreliable, while other metaphilosophers 
try to defend their use.
I have my doubts about the project of a general metaphilosophy, at least 
if it is understood as a kind of normative philosophy of science applied to 
philosophy. I believe that there are two dilemmas metaphilosophy on that 
conception is confronted with, which make it very unlikely that it can arrive 
at interesting and binding results. The reason is that philosophy (in a way to 
be explained below) is (and should be) too heterogeneous to allow for such 
results. I will explain the two dilemmas in this section. I also have my doubts 
about the particular focus on intuitions and the discussion of their evidential 
weight.
However, the current discussion of the role of intuitions seems to be evi-
dence that there is a way around both dilemmas, and that the focus on intu-
itions is justified. Apparently, philosophy is not as heterogeneous as the prima 
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facie considerations that I will offer below suggest. It seems that “hypotheti-
cal cases” play a role everywhere in philosophy, and intuitions play a role in 
hypothetical cases. Therefore, if we understand the role that intuitions play 
there, we actually can arrive at interesting and binding results for almost all 
areas of philosophy. The current metaphilosophical discussion often refers to 
this as “the method of cases”. In section 2, I will explain what this method is 
supposed to be.
In the rest of my paper, I will argue that appearances are misleading here. 
Even though hypothetical cases, in a broad sense of the notion, play some role 
in many areas of philosophy, this role is not always the same. And for most 
of the roles we will identify in section 3, only one of them could give rise to 
the methodological worries about the evidential weight of intuitions (such as 
those raised by experimental philosophers that I alluded to above), because 
only one of these roles has room for an evidential use of intuitions.
Thus, even if hypothetical cases are often considered in philosophy (for 
some purpose or other), the fact that we might be able to say something inter-
esting and binding about one role that hypothetical cases play does not mean 
that we have thereby said something interesting and binding about all areas 
of philosophy, or the dominant methodology, etc.
Now, the role that does have room for an evidential use of intuitions is the 
role of presenting hypothetical cases as counterexamples. Still, one might 
argue, this methodological function of hypothetical cases is common enough. 
So why should it not be possible to say something interesting and binding 
about this role and the evidential use of intuitions in this case?
As I will argue in section 4, there are at least three different models for how 
we might think about the way in which intuitive judgements provide “coun-
terexamples” to a proposed theory. These different models are associated with 
different philosophical projects and motivated by certain assumptions about 
the nature of the subject matter of philosophical inquiry. On only one of these 
models would intuitions play an evidential role of the kind that seems to be 
assumed in the current metaphilosophical debate.
In section 5, I will discuss whether that latter model is often instantiated 
when hypothetical cases are presented as counterexamples, and I will offer an 
alternative conception of how we manage by way of presenting hypothetical 
cases to refute a theory, which does not refer to intuitions at all. Moreover, 
this alternative also has certain explanatory virtues over the idea that intu-
itions play a relevant role in the evaluation of hypothetical cases.
Section 6 will discuss the weight of the evidence I presented. I will 
argue that the evidence establishes the following claims: The abundance 
of hypothetical cases in philosophy is not evidence of a common and 
widespread methodology that crucially involves intuitions as evidence: 
(1) Most methodological roles of hypothetical cases have no room for any 
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role of intuitions. (2) Using hypothetical cases as counterexamples leaves 
room for intuitions, but we can distinguish at least three roles intuitions 
could play there, only one of which is an evidential role. (3) For the 
cases where this last model would apply, there is a plausible alternative 
story of how hypothetical cases work, that does not involve intuitions at 
all. Hence, my scepticism about metaphilosophy in general and its dis-
cussion of the special role of intuitions in philosophy in particular seem 
vindicated.
1.1 Interesting?
So, what are the two dilemmas I see for metaphilosophy? The first one has 
to do with the fact that philosophy is simply too heterogeneous to allow for 
a very interesting general methodology. Methodological questions arise rela-
tive to the aims or goals one has set oneself. They are questions of the type 
“What is the best way to achieve X?” But it is not clear at all that all areas 
of philosophy plausibly involve the same X here at any interesting level of 
abstraction. Let us see why. Perhaps the best candidate for philosophy’s gen-
eral goal is to find the truth. After all, philosophy is a compound of φιλειν 
and σoĮια, and translates as Love of Wisdom, so should we not conceive of 
philosophy’s aim in general to be cognitive?
First of all, it is not clear that all philosophy aims at truth. Is practical 
philosophy, ethics in particular, after discovering moral truth? If you are a 
non-cognitivist about ethics, you will dispute such assumption. And ethics 
is not the only area in which a non-cognitivist attitude might make sense. 
In those cases, the aim of philosophical inquiry might rather be seen in the 
development of normative proposals (for example, proposals to use certain 
concepts in certain refined ways, for all areas of philosophy who conceive of 
their enterprise as one of providing explications in Rudolf Carnap’s sense of 
the word, cf. Carnap, 1967).
Second, even if we would agree that at least large parts of philosophy aim 
at truth, it is not clear that “truth” alone characterizes an aim that could deter-
mine a specific methodology. Different kinds of truths might require different 
methods for their discovery. Is our epistemic access to metaphysical truths the 
same as our access to conceptual or logical truths? Those who hold on to an 
analytic/synthetic distinction might doubt that it is. Logical truth is perhaps 
plausibly accessible a priori, but at least some metaphysical truths might be 
only a posteriori knowable.
Rejecting the a priori/a posteriori distinction improves the situation only 
slightly. Sociology, Linguistics, History, Particle Physics and Astronomy are 
all a posteriori disciplines, but they have very different methodologies, that 
display similarities only on a very high level of abstraction. The reason for 
16028-0337dr2.indd   97 27-02-2020   19:49:41
98 Chapter 5
that is that their subject matter and our epistemic access to that subject matter 
is very different, even if it is all a posteriori.
It seems that in order to argue for a general methodology for philosophy, 
one would first need to answer a number of substantial philosophical ques-
tions in specific ways. Are moral questions cognitive? Are there metaphysical 
truths that are only a posteriori knowable? Is logic a priori? Are there any 
analytic truths, knowable on the basis of linguistic competence alone? When 
dealing with questions like these, one is already engaging with central topics 
in first-order philosophy, one is already doing philosophy. But how can one 
hope to formulate a methodology of philosophy, if that presupposes answers 
to questions like these?
Thus, the first dilemma is that the wider one wants to cast one’s net in order 
to formulate a methodology for as many areas of philosophy as possible, the 
less interesting the methodological recommendations are going to be. Either 
we go for a discipline-wide methodology which is going to be trivial, or we 
chose a more substantial methodology, which then holds only for a very nar-
row subfield.
1.2 Binding?
The second dilemma is closely related. Let us assume for the sake of argu-
ment that there is a subsection of philosophy that on the one hand contains 
a good deal of philosophy (say, for the sake of an example, all of theoretical 
philosophy, excluding only applied ethics), and for which one was indeed 
able to identify a common subject matter (say, one endorses a philosophi-
cal view on which all of theoretical philosophy is interested in metaphysical 
truth). And let us further assume that for that subject matter, one finds and 
argues for a suitable methodology (perhaps one, according to which our epis-
temic access to metaphysical necessity and possibility is based in our general 
capacity to evaluate counterfactuals).
In this case, one might have found a methodology which is in equilibrium 
with a considerable amount of first-order philosophical views. Views about 
the subject matter of various sub-branches of theoretical philosophy, views 
about how metaphysical truth differs from, for example, conceptual truth or 
mere contingent empirical truth, views about the reducibility of metaphysical 
necessity and possibility to certain counterfactuals, views about the epistemo-
logical consequences such a reduction would have, and finally views about 
the unproblematic nature of our knowledge of counterfactuals.
The problem is that the view as a whole might be a considerably stable pack-
age, but this methodology will be unfounded for those who do not endorse all 
elements of that package, or who want to critically engage with some of those 
elements. At least, it will be in danger of being unfounded, since thus far, all 
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one has done is establishing that there is this one equilibrium between certain 
first-order philosophical views and a certain methodology.
Perhaps there is some interesting philosophy one can do in this tight corset 
of views. But the problem is that the normative proposal will only be bind-
ing for philosophers who accept to be limited by that corset of views. Thus, 
instead of having defended a methodology for philosophy, one will have 
defended a methodology for philosophers who share first-order commitments 
C1, . . ., Cn. Here the problem is practical: Does it make sense to formulate a 
methodology in philosophy, when it is binding only for a few confederates? 
Again we are confronted with a similar dilemma; we may go for a method-
ology that is binding for a larger group, but only at the cost of arriving at a 
methodology that is again trivial.
Another question is whether having a substantial and general methodology 
makes a lot of sense in philosophy. It is one thing to strive to choose meth-
odological means that are not in conflict with one’s theoretical commitments, 
for the sake of avoiding pragmatic contradictions. But it is a different project 
to formulate a normative philosophical methodology. If the latter requires a 
commitment to a certain set of first-order views, then it seems diametrically 
opposed to the spirit of philosophy as a maximally open inquiry in which 
not only everything is up for debate, but where actually everything is in fact 
debated. If that is what metaphilosophy is all about, then it is not clear what 
good metaphilosophy can do for philosophy.
2 THE METHOD OF CASES
However, this pessimism about metaphilosophy seems refuted by the discov-
ery that there – after all – is a method that is common to all of philosophy. 
Joel Pust describes the method as follows (Pust, 2016):
The Method of Cases
A philosophical theory is taken to be prima facie undermined by contradicting 
an intuition regarding a particular hypothetical case.
How widespread the method is in philosophy, and that it can be found in all 
its subareas, is usually confirmed by providing a list of prominent hypotheti-
cal cases from all these areas. Pust does that too (Pust, 2016):
Such examples [Gettier case, Thomson’s transplant case, Block’s Chinese 
nation, Bromberger’s flagpole case] could easily be multiplied to include tele-
transportation and fission cases in the literature on personal identity, preemp-
tion and epiphenomena cases in the literature on causation and explanation, 
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clairvoyance and evil demon cases in epistemology, Newcomb cases in decision 
theory, Frankfurt cases in the literature on free will, Twin-Earth and Swampman 
cases in the literature on mental content, Jackson’s Mary case in the metaphysics 
of mind, trolley cases in applied ethics, experience machine cases in normative 
ethics, and many many others.
I want to argue in this paper that, although there are some methods in 
philosophy that fit under the description provided by Pust, these are not 
identical methods, and they are less prominent in philosophy than the list of 
hypothetical cases typically provided would suggest (in fact, those methods 
that fit comfortably under the description provided are somewhat idiosyn-
cratic). There is an obvious problem with the kind of argument I would 
like to make. First of all, it seems that if methods have a common descrip-
tion, then unless they all fall under the description because the description 
is ambiguous, it should be fair to count them as being the same method 
according to that level of description. Second, in light of the first point, 
I seem to be also committed to the claim that there is one level of descrip-
tion that is the proper level for characterizing a method, such that descrip-
tions at a higher level of generality would be too general to determine a 
method. Otherwise, one could respond to my criticism of the provided 
characterization of the method of cases by simply providing a more general 
characterization, which would then serve as a new candidate for a definition 
of the common method of philosophy.
I think one has to acknowledge (as I already did in the introduction) 
that there might well be a “method” that is common to all philosophy 
if this method is described in extremely general terms. However, I also 
believe that acknowledging the existence of this common method will not 
tell us anything interesting about philosophy, nor will the analysis of this 
method lead to interesting normative conclusions about how philosophy 
should be done.
However, both of the latter are supposed to be true of the method of cases. 
Rationalists, deflationists and experimental philosophers alike assume that 
the method of cases is described at a level of generality that allows to inves-
tigate what particular role intuitions play in the refutation of theories, and 
whether it can be justified that intuitions play that role. So I should clarify 
the aim of my paper accordingly: I will argue that there is no method of cases 
in philosophy that is in any interesting way widespread and would allow dis-
cussion of whether the use of intuitions is justified in general in that method.
In the next section, I will first show that the (indeed widespread) use of 
hypothetical scenarios in philosophy does not correspond to an equally wide-
spread method. Hypothetical cases serve several very different functions in 
philosophy.
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3 HYPOTHETICAL CASES IN PHILOSOPHY
Critics as well as advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy usually 
point to long lists of hypothetical cases that we find in philosophy and sug-
gest that this establishes that there is a common method in philosophy: the 
method of cases. However, the first thing to note is that hypothetical cases 
serve several different functions in philosophy. Here is a quick (and probably 
incomplete)14 overview.
3.1 Analogies
Often, hypothetical cases are used as analogies and thus as a means of illus-
tration. This is one way to interpret Plato’s cave story. Plato is describing a 
hypothetical situation of people chained in a cave and looking at shadows 
that they confuse for the real things, in order to illustrate how, on his account, 
our own epistemic predicament keeps us from appreciating what is real. The 
point of the story is to illustrate our epistemic predicament by analogy with 
the predicament of those in the cave. On this interpretation, Plato is not test-
ing a theory. He is not even quite presenting a thought experiment, because – 
like ordinary experiments – thought experiments consider scenarios from the 
domain of things at issue. But what is at issue here is Plato’s theory of our 
ordinary knowledge. The situation in the cave is not in the domain of that 
theory; the point of the story is that the situation in the cave is just in certain 
ways analogous to cases of ordinary knowledge.
Let us make that explicit by defining a thought experiment as the consider-
ation of a hypothetical case from the domain of things at issue. This definition 
should make the notion of thought experiment as flexible as our notion of an 
14 One could add a further category that one might call “functional thought experiments”. This 
category of thought experiments is again a bit of an outlier, just as analogies are. However, the cases 
that fall into this category are often called “thought experiments” and it is worth having a quick look, 
because they actually do cause certain epistemological concern. Philosophers of science identified 
these “functional” thought experiments (Stöltzner, 2004). Such thought experiments do not originate 
from outside a theory in order to test or illustrate the theory, but they are themselves part of the 
theory. The theory itself prescribes the contemplation of a certain thought experiment in its applica-
tion conditions.
It is easiest to describe what is meant by this with a philosophical example. Some theories in 
practical philosophy prescribe that in order to determine whether a certain action is morally permis-
sible one should first perform certain hypothetical considerations. For example, such a theory might 
suggest to hypothetically consider the evaluation of the consequences of the action from the point of 
view of every person that will be affected by the consequences of that action. This is a hypothetical 
exercise, and it is about the domain of things at issue. It is also epistemically dubious. First of all, 
such thought experiments must lead to reliable outcomes in order to be useful for their purpose. That 
means, they must actually lead to good estimates of how the consequences of a certain action would 
be evaluated by those affected, since otherwise the whole exercise would be pointless. However, for 
all we know about human psychology, these thought experiments are highly unlikely to lead to reli-
able predictions.
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experiment is. Experiments do not always test – sometimes they illustrate 
(just think about the experiments your chemistry teacher performed in class), 
or they explore the behaviour of a system that you like to learn more about 
(perhaps yet in absence of any theory).
3.2 Illustrations
Like many mere analogies also thought experiments often only illustrate a 
point. Which thought experiments only serve such illustrative purposes might 
be controversial (for reasons to be discussed below), but here is a nice exam-
ple from physics: imagine what would happen to the earth if the sun were 
suddenly to explode. According to the Newtonian theory, the earth would 
immediately depart from its usual elliptical orbit, while Einstein’s theory pre-
dicts that the earth would stay in its usual orbit for another eight minutes, the 
time it takes for light to travel from the sun to earth. Here, the hypothetical 
cases (the sun suddenly explodes) are used to illustrate the difference between 
Newton’s and Einstein’s theory. The two theories make significantly different 
predictions about a certain extreme case.
Of course, such illustrations also work in the case of just a single theory. 
Physics textbooks are full of examples that illustrate how a theory would 
apply, with the intention to explain the content of the theory to the reader. 
What matters for the success of such thought experiments is whether they 
get the intended message across, whether the reader indeed achieves a bet-
ter grasp of the theory so illustrated. What does not matter much for this is 
whether the outcome is significantly “intuitive” in any sense. It does not mat-
ter either whether the scenario described is in any sense really possible (e.g. 
whether it is physically possible that the sun simply disappears without the 
event causing this (an explosion, etc.) having any relevant effects of its own).
3.3 Puzzle Cases
These thought experiments typically have the features that Cappelen identi-
fied in his (2012): They function as a “fact focuser” in that they “draw our 
attention to a philosophically significant feature of the world”, and their 
presentation typically exhibits what Cappelen calls “lack of a clear conclu-
sion”; the hypothetical cases present real puzzles that subsequent philosophi-
cal analysis is supposed to solve. As such, they are often starting points of 
philosophical theory building.
A good example for this function is provided by a certain interpretation of 
the trolley case pair, as one often finds it in ethics textbooks. One case of that 
pair is the so-called “standard trolley problem”. In the standard trolley prob-
lem, you are standing by a railroad track when you notice that an uncontrolled 
16028-0337dr2.indd   102 27-02-2020   19:49:42
 Thought Experiments and the (Ir-)relevance of Intuitions in Philosophy 103
trolley is rolling down the track, heading for a group of five railroad workers. 
You know that they will all be killed if the trolley continues on its path. The 
only thing you can do to prevent these five deaths is to throw a switch that 
will divert the trolley onto a side track, where it will kill only one person. 
When considering what you should do in such case, it seems that you should 
throw the switch and save the lives of five for the life of one. The other case 
of the pair, the “footbridge case”, is very similar. Again, the trolley is about to 
kill five people. This time, however, you are not standing near the track, but 
on a footbridge above the track. Also, this time you cannot divert the trolley 
by throwing a switch. You can only stop the trolley by putting something in 
its way that is heavy enough. You consider throwing yourself in front of the 
trolley, but you know that you are not heavy enough to stop it. Standing next 
to you, however, is a very large stranger. The only way you can stop the trol-
ley killing the five people is by pushing this large stranger off the footbridge, 
in front of the trolley. If you push the stranger off, he will be killed, but you 
will save the other five. Again, considering what you should do, this time it 
seems wrong to push the stranger off the bridge even though, as before, you 
would save the lives of five for the life of one.
In Thomson’s (1976) presentation of the two cases, her intention was to 
provoke a theoretical analysis of why it is that we react differently to the 
two cases although they seem on a par with respect to their morally relevant 
aspects (it seems that in both cases you need to decide whether you should 
kill one in order to save the lives of five by active intervention). Puzzle cases 
are cases in which it is either not clear what we should say about the case, 
or where our pretheoretic judgement about the case seems incoherent (as in 
the trolley case), and they are typically intended to provoke or motivate a 
theoretical analysis.
Since the intention is to bring a certain type of case to the attention of phi-
losophers, the case described must be relevant: It must be a possible case. In 
this way puzzle cases have to satisfy more constraints than mere illustrations. 
However, a puzzle case, just like an illustration case, does not have to elicit 
any clear intuitive judgement. They are puzzles – they will provoke theoreti-
cal analysis precisely because it is not clear what to say about them.
3.4 Counterexamples
Certainly, the most prominent kind of thought experiments is thought experi-
ments that are intended to function as counterexamples. Some philosophers 
have even seen that as a defining feature of thought experiments. These 
thought experiments are intended to lead to justified belief revision in the 
addressee. Because of that, they need to satisfy much stricter constraints. 
Again, the case described must be a possible case, and it must be possible in 
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the right way, the description of the scenario to be evaluated should not beg 
the question against the theory under attack, etc. We will look at this function 
in detail in section 4.
3.5 Do Thought Experiments Have a Life of Their Own?
What I want to argue in this section is that even if all thought experiments 
that are used as counterexamples would involve intuitions, it is not clear that 
that function (being a counterexample) is very widespread within philosophy. 
As the overview that I just gave shows, not every hypothetical case that plays 
some role in a philosophical text is a thought experiment (some are merely 
analogies), and even those that count as thought experiments (according 
to our definition) do not all lead to the kind of worries that, for example, 
experimental philosophers seem to have. Thought experiments that are used 
as illustrations and thought experiments that play the role of puzzle cases 
may or may not involve intuitive judgements. When they do, the reliability of 
these judgements is irrelevant for the satisfaction conditions of their function.
One way to understand the argumentation in (Cappelen, 2012) is to read it 
as an attempt to show that most thought experiments that people have sorted 
in the category “counterexample” do in fact belong into the category “puzzle 
case”. Consequently, some of the discussion of Cappelen’s arguments was 
then over whether he looked at the real cases and whether he sorted the cases 
he looked at into the right categories (cf. Chalmers, 2014).
I do not find it surprising that there is controversy over how to interpret 
certain thought experiments and that people come to hold different views 
about the function of a thought experiment depending on whether they read 
the original text in which the thought experiment was first put forward, or a 
later textbook version of it. I think this is partly (but largely) to be explained 
by the fact that thought experiments can have lives of their own (as Ian Hack-
ing once prominently denied, cf. Hacking, 1992). What does that mean?
A certain hypothetical case C, invented by philosopher P, might start its 
philosophical career as a puzzle case, either only in the mind of P or perhaps 
also in her writing. Maybe it is a puzzle case for P, because she realized that 
what she intuitively or pretheoretically wants to say about the case is differ-
ent from what she thinks she should say on the basis of theoretical analysis, 
applying the current theory T to C. Other considerations and further reflection 
lead P eventually to a view about C that agrees with her pretheoretic evalu-
ation. T is mistaken and has to be revised. P herself might now see C as a 
counterexample to T. P now presents a new theory, T* and presents it in writ-
ing. Explaining what the difference is between T* and T, she uses C in order 
to show how the content of T* is different from the content of T (just as we 
did above with our example of the disappearing sun).
AuQ6
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C can have these different functions for P; C can have these functions, of 
course, also for the readers of P’s writings. Perhaps they find C to be a chal-
lenge, perhaps they are immediately convinced that C refutes T, perhaps they 
already were convinced that the old theory is mistaken and see C as a brilliant 
illustration of what is wrong with it. Or they were already tacit believers of 
T* and see C as an illustration of its merits. Accordingly, the function that C 
has in (some of) the writings of P and the function it has in textbooks or in 
the accounts of other philosophers might well differ. Even if there is a fact of 
the matter of how P intended C to function in a specific text15, it might well 
be that readers with different backgrounds interpret the dialectical function 
of C differently.
This complicates matters for quasi-empirical studies such as Cappelen’s, 
which want to establish that thought experiments in most/many/all cases have 
this or that function (of course, the same holds for those philosophers that 
Cappelen is attacking, who make equally general claims about the proper 
interpretation of thought experiments).
4 THREE MODELS FOR COUNTEREXAMPLES
OK, so the fact that we find considerations of hypothetical cases every-
where in philosophy does not by itself establish that there is a method 
common to much of (analytic) philosophy. Also, not every time that we 
think that a hypothetical case serves a certain dialectical function (such as 
that of a counterexample) does the case serve that function (for the author, 
or other readers). Hence initial appearances might well be quite misleading 
and it might be that there is not as much methodological unity to philoso-
phy after all.
You might object that, still, you can find thought experiments used as coun-
terexamples everywhere in philosophy in a very high concentration, such that 
even if you are mistaken about the proper function of some of them, still there 
must be enough to speak of a widespread method. What I want to argue in 
this section is that this impression is misleading too. The status of “counter-
examples” differs between different philosophical “projects”. The possible 
relevance that the reliability of intuitions could play for the reliability of the 
method of cases varies with that status. On several such projects, the reliabil-
ity of intuitions plays no role, even if it turned out that intuitive judgements 
are involved in the method of cases.
15 I do not think that there always has to be a fact of the matter what communicative intentions 
are behind a piece of text. Especially with written text, these intentions can change in the process of 
writing. Just consider those cases in which you had to rationally reconstruct your own arguments.
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Philosophy allows for the coexistence and the overlap of these projects 
in all of its subdisciplines. Therefore, any results about the reliability of 
intuitions are not relevant for philosophy in general, not even for specific 
debates within philosophy, but at best for certain philosophers in those 
debates, namely, those philosophers who assign a certain foundational role 
to intuitions. As I will argue in section 5, it seems to me that only very few 
philosophers actually do that. But let us first look at my argument for the 
project-relativity of the status of counterexamples.
4.1 Evidence
The first project is what most people writing about the method of cases and 
criticizing the reliability of intuitions seem to have in mind, the Evidence 
Model. Here, the aim of philosophical research is typically considered to 
be an inquiry into certain matters of fact, which are themselves “intuition- 
independent”. With the latter I mean that the facts in question are neither 
constituted by intuitions, nor by the psychological basis for these intuitions. 
For example, on a current understanding of metaphysics, metaphysicians try 
to find out what “grounds” what. They assume that there is a matter of fact 
of what grounds what, and that fact is neither constituted by our intuitions, 
nor by whatever psychological mechanism gives rise to our having these intu-
itions. If, on such a conception of the subject matter of philosophical inquiry, 
you take your intuitive evaluation of a hypothetical case as evidence about 
that subject matter, then you follow a certain type of philosophical project, 
which I call the “Evidence Model”. You might or might not have a story about 
why your intuitive evaluation of such a hypothetical case is evidence about 
those facts that you intend to investigate. In either case, learning that the 
mere intuitive evaluation of hypothetical cases varies much between persons, 
is prima facie bad news for you. However, even on this model, there is some 
room for manoeuvre (and we will discuss this in more detail in section 5).
4.2 Reflective Equilibrium
However, not everyone conceives of the subject matter of philosophy in that 
way. Resnik (1999), for example, holds that there is no fact of the matter of 
whether something is a logical truth, others are non-factualists about moral 
truth, or ontology, etc. Still, these philosophers might nevertheless follow a 
methodology which involves the intuitive consideration of hypothetical cases 
and the use of such cases – in some sense – as counterexamples to proposed 
theories. Nelson Goodman (1955) described this methodology as that of find-
ing a reflective equilibrium between our intuitive evaluation of cases and our 
endorsed general principles. In that process, sometimes general principles are 
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given up, because we decide to consider an intuitive evaluation of a hypotheti-
cal case to be worth preserving, sometimes the general principle trumps our 
intuitive evaluation, perhaps because it is better entrenched. In the former case, 
the hypothetical case works as a counterexample against the proposed theory.
However, on this project our intuitive evaluations are not evidence about 
a further subject matter that this methodology seeks to investigate. There are 
no facts of the matter about these things. Learning that intuitions are prone to 
influences that we do not have under control or that they vary much between 
persons is interesting but neither very surprising nor very worrying. We 
thought we need to regiment those intuitive evaluations anyway.
4.3 Constitution
Still, your account of what you are up to in philosophy might differ from both 
of these. Perhaps you do believe that there are facts of the matter of what 
philosophers are interested in, but these facts are not intuition-independent. 
In his (2007) Alvin Goldman argues that philosophers are interested in inves-
tigating concepts in a personal psychological sense, and that these are, at the 
same time, the psychological basis for our dispositions to evaluate hypotheti-
cal cases intuitively in certain ways (Goldman, 2007, p. 15):
It’s part of the nature of concepts (in the personal psychological sense) that pos-
sessing a concept tends to give rise to beliefs and intuitions that accord with the 
contents of the concept. If the content of someone’s concept F implies that F 
does (doesn’t) apply to example x, then that person is disposed to intuit that F 
applies (doesn’t apply) to x when the issue is raised in his mind.
Still, on this model, your intuitive evaluation of a hypothetical case can 
serve as a counterexample to a proposed theory about what the psychological 
concept in question is. But, again, the relevance of, for example, interpersonal 
variation in application intuitions is limited. If you are first of all interested 
in personal psychological concepts, then inter-personal differences in such 
concepts might be interesting, but not a threat of any kind to your methodol-
ogy. If you connect further aims with your study of personal psychological 
concepts (for example, if your ultimate aim is to study the content of concepts 
in a certain population), then too much interpersonal variation might either 
lead you to distinguish between competence and performance (if there is an 
available causal explanation for the interpersonal differences in performance) 
or it might convince you that your project is pointless. But then this is because 
your assumptions about the subject matter were mistaken (the subject matter 
is too messy to allow systematic theorizing), but not because intuitions turned 
out to be too unreliable evidence for that subject matter.
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These are just three stereotypical ways in which philosophers might con-
ceive of the project that they are engaged in. Possibly there are more, and 
certainly, there are mixed versions of these projects. The point is that philoso-
phers from different projects might still all participate in one and the same 
philosophical debate, arguing about the same theories and the same proposed 
counterexamples, albeit assigning very different roles to those intuitive evalu-
ations of hypothetical cases; they might play the role of evidence about that 
subject matter, they might be part of the construction of the subject matter, or 
of the constitution of it. The reliability of intuitions, of the kind that experi-
mental philosophers attack and that their foes defend, is only of relevance to 
some of the participants in these debate and their projects.
5 INTUITIONS VERSUS COMMON GROUND
Still you might think that philosophers who follow the project characterized 
as the Evidence Model are clearly the majority. Few philosophers (one often 
reads) would nowadays declare that they are in the business of doing concep-
tual analysis of any kind, let alone of personal psychological concepts. Anti-
realists about philosophy’s subject matter are likewise the minority in many 
debates. So, still, is that not sufficient reason for paying close attention to the 
reliability of intuitions in our judgements about hypothetical cases?
The three models that I presented in the last section all had two things in 
common, they all used hypothetical cases as counterexamples and they gave 
intuitions a central role in the evaluation of these hypothetical cases. With 
the exception of the third model, in which intuitions are partly constituting 
the subject matter, I could have described these models without bringing 
in intuitions at all. We could describe the second model as one that departs 
from pretheoretic beliefs, and the first as one that takes judgements about 
hypothetical cases that are in the common ground between the parties in the 
philosophical debate as evidence for and against theories.
Why should philosophers do the latter? Because that way they have a better 
chance to convince their readers of their arguments. Why should other phi-
losophers accept such evidence? Because they also think that the evaluation 
of these cases is correct. As Cappelen (2012) has shown, this description of 
the method of cases accounts much better for the way in which the evaluation 
of hypothetical cases is usually embedded in argumentations. Philosophers 
give reasons for evaluating a hypothetical case in a certain way. Reasons for 
the correctness of the evaluation, and typically not for the intensity or quality 
of any intuition. You might or might not have arrived at your evaluation of 
the hypothetical case purely intuitively. But it does not seem to matter for the 
significance of your evaluation when you did.
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True, there are exceptions. Some philosophers indeed merely refer to their 
intuition and do not think that it is required or even possible to provide further 
justification of their judgement. It is a long shot to argue that philosophers 
who follow that program are the actual majority. If they are not then it might 
seem as if the Evidence Model is widespread in philosophy, while in fact 
intuitions play no terribly significant evidential role.
6 CONCLUSION
I sketched different philosophical projects and argued that the question of 
whether intuitions are reliable is not of relevance for the majority of these 
projects. I also argued that the evidence (for example, the evidence collected 
in Cappelen (2012)) suggests that this is not only true for the majority of logi-
cally possible philosophical projects, but true for the majority of the actually 
implemented ones.
So, the methods which can – at an abstract level – all be made to fit under 
the description “using hypothetical cases as counterexamples” are in fact too 
diverse to allow for an interesting, general metaphilosophical analysis. This is 
a descriptive metaphilosophical result. The result is based on a rather liberal 
attitude towards those different projects. Perhaps many of the projects that 
I identified are ill-conceived. Even though I found philosophers who seem 
to endorse them, perhaps they do not in fact follow them (on rational recon-
struction of their work), but just fell prey to a metaphilosophical confusion. 
Once the ill-conceived projects are eliminated, could it not be the case that 
interesting metaphilosophical claims can be made about the remaining scene?
That is probably so. I even believe that it is definitely so, since I believe 
that I have a somewhat clear idea of what I do when I do philosophy, and 
also believe that this is a better way of doing it then all the alternatives. But 
the reasons for following one project rather than another are typically not 
just matters of internal consistency or feasibility in principle. They are also 
matters of personal interest and subjective pragmatic judgement. Perhaps the 
role of metaphilosophy could be to provoke reflection on the relevant issues 
in order to increase the number of philosophers who work within a well-
conceived program. But that will still probably not result in a convergence 
of these programs. It is just too obvious that the standards for what counts as 
“philosophically interesting” are very different even between otherwise very 
like-minded philosophers.
So philosophy is just stuck with methodological pluralism. But, as I said 
before, this is to be expected and it is not actually detrimental for philoso-
phy. It is to be expected, because in philosophy everything is always up for 
grabs. The idea that philosophy as a whole should follow something like a 
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theoretically defined paradigm seems to go against the very nature of the 
subject. That is why we should not expect convergence of philosophical 
projects. It does not seem to be a problem either, since, as I also indicated 
before, even if philosophers engaged in different projects might interpret the 
role and value of judgements about hypothetical cases differently, on none 
of the accounts that we looked at do hypothetical cases come out being irrel-
evant. Philosophers of all projects sketched can and do participate in the same 
debates about the same theories and the same proposed counterexamples. 
Moreover, they even manage to sometimes reach an agreement about when a 
theory should be abandoned in light of such counterexample.
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